When \u27Good\u27 Corporate Governance Makes \u27Bad\u27 (Financial) Firms: The Global Crisis and the Limits of Private Law by Howson, Nicholas C.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
2009
When 'Good' Corporate Governance Makes 'Bad'
(Financial) Firms: The Global Crisis and the Limits
of Private Law
Nicholas C. Howson
University of Michigan Law School, nhowson@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/142
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Howson, Nicholas C. "When 'Good' Corporate Governance Makes 'Bad' (Financial) Firms: The Global Crisis and the Limits of
Private Law." Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 108 (2009): 44-50.
44
WHEN “GOOD” CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
MAKES “BAD” (FINANCIAL) FIRMS:  
THE GLOBAL CRISIS AND THE  
LIMITS OF PRIVATE LAW 
Nicholas Calcina Howson*†
Introduction 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, investors, 
analysts, legislators, and pundits have spotlighted “good” or “improved” 
corporate governance as a remedy for all that presently ails us. It is one 
remedy in a long wish list that includes tougher requirements for risk capi-
tal, liquidity, and leverage; compensation and bonus reform; reimposition of 
the Glass-Steagall-like separation of bank “utility” and “casino” functions; 
the downsizing or breakup of institutions deemed “too big to fail;” enhanced 
consumer protection; securities law liability for secondary violators (like 
credit rating agencies); direct taxation of proprietary trading; “macro-
prudential” regulation; and new transparency requirements for derivatives 
trading and clearance.  
This time, the proposed objects of corporate governance reform are not 
Michael Eisner’s personal “magic kingdom” at the Walt Disney Company or 
Andy Fastow’s self-dealing and ultimately self-deceiving Enron Corpora-
tion, but the global financial institutions that saw their balance sheets 
degraded—and the global credit markets put at risk—by proprietary trading 
in so-called “toxic” assets and other high-risk, high-reward, “casino” activi-
ties. The renewed focus on good corporate governance pertains not only to 
the perceived asymmetry between the outlandish compensation dished out 
at now bankrupt or massively bailed-out firms, but also to the traditional, 
broader roster of corporate governance mechanisms designed to enhance 
director-manager accountability to firm “owners”—the shareholders. In this 
case, however, more effective corporate governance may not be a serious 
part of the solution; instead, “good” (or effectively functioning) corporate 
governance may have been one of the major factors that contributed to the 
global financial meltdown. This insight highlights the existence of unalter-
able constraints on any corporate governance system, and emphasizes the 
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need for even more robust government regulation of private businesses—
especially firms that function at the core of a global capital allocation sys-
tem. 
I. The Rhetorical Rush for Improved Corporate Governance 
The focus on corporate governance reform as a remedy for the global fi-
nancial disaster is embodied in the text of the Shareholder Bill of Rights Act 
introduced in the U.S. Senate in May 2009. The legislation states that 
“[a]mong the central causes of the financial and economic crises that the 
United States faces today has been a widespread failure of corporate gov-
ernance.” (emphasis added) Like the Compensation Fairness statute passed 
by the U.S. House of Representatives in July 2009, the Senate bill uses the 
global financial crisis as the justification for a long list of measures advo-
cated by shareholder activists over the past two decades. The statute seeks 
not only to promote checks on, and accountability for, executive compensa-
tion, but also to “provide shareholders with enhanced authority over the 
nomination [and] election . . . of public company executives” and to incen-
tivize executives “to appropriately analyze and oversee enterprise risk, 
and . . . prioritize the long-term health of their firms and their shareholders.” 
The statute would amend the 1934 Securities Exchange Act to (i) mandate 
“say on pay” and “golden parachute” advisory shareholder votes, the sepa-
ration of the offices of chairman and chief executive officer, majority 
affirmative voting in director elections, and the creation of a new “risk 
committee” composed of independent directors responsible for overseeing 
risk management practices; (ii) eliminate the possibility of staggered boards 
(so effective at blocking changes to corporate control); and (iii) permit the 
inclusion of shareholder nominees to the board of directors in corporate 
proxies. 
This rush to improve corporate governance structures, as exemplified by 
the Senate’s Shareholder Bill of Rights Act, is entirely understandable as a 
gut response to the crisis and the crippling worldwide recession-depression 
that followed. No one can deny the power of the idea underlying initiatives 
such as the Shareholder Bill of Rights: that firm managers are accountable 
to, and should work in the interest of, the bearers of residual risk—the eq-
uity holders. Yet, in the wake of the sudden collapse of Lehman Brothers 
and the near-demise of Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, and AIG, that obligation 
has been narrowed to focus on the duty of managers to avoid bankruptcy 
and maintain continuing business operations. At the same time, and because 
of these shocking failures, the equally powerful and complementary idea 
that well-governed firms and their managers should produce the highest 
returns for shareholders is largely ignored. The current chorus urging im-
proved corporate governance at financial firms thus places too much 
emphasis on the first motive (avoiding terminal failure in times of despera-
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tion) while ignoring the perverse incentives produced by the latter (boosting 
current profits in boom times). 
Not to be misunderstood, I should declare my strong affection for the 
concept of good corporate governance. The fact is, however, that good cor-
porate governance, and what we yearn for as improved corporate 
governance, only really functions effectively in two limited areas: protection 
against opportunistic or conflicted behavior by insiders–agents, and internal 
firm monitoring. In the first area, those aspects of corporate governance 
which restrict ex ante, or identify and punish ex post, loyalty breaches, con-
flicts of interest, related party transactions, asset stripping, oppression and 
the like, are appropriately directed at protecting the interests of minority 
shareholders. (Of course, oftentimes conflicted, related party or apparently 
“disloyal” transactions may serve the interest of the firm and ultimately 
even the minority shareholders. Corporate governance works most effec-
tively in these situations by helping firm owners understand the prospect of 
such transactions ex ante and allowing them informed approval powers with 
respect to the same. The same mechanisms also provide ex post sanctions
which incentivize conflicted insiders to seek either such approval ex ante or 
immediate ratification.) Thus, restrictions or approval powers on sky-high 
compensation doled out by boards to executives who dominate or who have 
selected the same boards—or protections against backdating executive op-
tions to ensure they are “in the money”—are entirely appropriate and 
effective in battling (and publicly shaming) insider opportunism. In the sec-
ond area, effective corporate governance also functions to increase 
transparency inside firms, so that vigilant managers can understand, moni-
tor, and direct the activity of firm agents. This is what the U.S. Senate bill 
refers to in alluding to the responsibility of public company executives “to 
appropriately analyze and oversee enterprise risk.” To the extent the global 
financial crisis truly resulted from “rogue” traders taking on too much risk 
under the noses of their unknowing managers, any monitoring duty that con-
forms to the standard articulated by Chancellor Allen in In re Caremark Int’l 
Inc. Derivative Litigation1 is a net positive, and could function to increase 
internal firm transparency, while helping top executives and the board of 
directors to actually monitor and direct such trading. 
II. The Harm Arising from “Good” Corporate Governance 
Sadly however, most other aspects of traditional corporate governance—
good or improved, indifferent or idealized—are quite irrelevant to what oc-
curs at modern firms. The irrelevance of corporate governance with respect 
to large, widely held, insider-dominated corporations is the subject of a huge 
literature, which I will not rehearse here. Suffice to say that the problems of 
information asymmetry, an overly accommodating business judgment rule 
that emasculates duty of care, collective action constraints, and cost-sharing 
obstacles are well understood. And such problems have been alleviated only 
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in part by the U.S. securities regulatory establishment dating from the New 
Deal, the derivative lawsuit action imported into U.S. state corporate law 
from England, and the combination of a robust class action mechanism and 
lawyers’ contingency fee arrangements allowing for cost-fronting and cost-
sharing. (Perhaps unfortunately, the power of these remedies has been sig-
nificantly diluted with the higher burdens created for private attorneys 
general in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the 
broad legislative and doctrinal assault on private securities litigation starting 
in the 1980s.) Even large institutional investors, long anointed as the saviors 
of “shareholder-oriented” corporate law and governance, proved largely 
absent in the attempt to monitor or rein in the likes of AIG, Citigroup, 
Merrill Lynch, and many other similar financial firms. In the financial sector 
specifically, this failure results not only from the same collective action ob-
stacles encountered by minority shareholders in traditional industrial firms, 
but also from the mind-boggling complexity of world-spanning financial 
institutions and their businesses. Even if inspired to monitor operations, few 
institutional investors (and perhaps few senior executives at the financial 
firms themselves) possess the technical expertise and breadth of knowledge 
to understand the financial products and trading strategies they are charged 
with overseeing, not to mention the global risk profile of the firm.  
More importantly, and the idea which animates this writing, is the worry 
that so-called “good” or improved corporate governance might be not sim-
ply irrelevant but actually harmful, and something which directly 
contributed to the 2008–2009 systemic dysfunction of the global financial 
sector. How is this so? The language of the Senate bill cited above provides 
a strong hint of the problem, specifically where the statute invokes im-
proved corporate governance so that managers will “prioritize the long-term 
health of their firms and their shareholders.” There is no doubt that the tra-
ditional menu of corporate governance mechanisms—designed to make 
management more responsive to the interests of shareholders—will cause 
those managers to “prioritize [the interests of] . . . their shareholders.”  
However, at the same time, there is very significant doubt as to whether 
that prioritization, or those interests, have anything whatsoever to do with 
the long-term health of the firms, much less with the long-term health and 
stability of the financial system more broadly. Indeed, for financial firms, 
the short-term shareholder interest is focused almost exclusively on reported 
profits and the directly related stock price. On this point, we may want to 
draw a distinction between industrial companies and financial sector firms. 
Industrial and manufacturing firms engage in the production and marketing 
of material goods and related services, and thus managers of such firms 
might truly be interested in long-term growth and continuing presence in a 
given products market. Conversely, financial firms engage in activities re-
lated to relatively instantaneous capital allocation, and increasingly the 
proprietary trading of financial instruments, where there is no long term 
interest for investors-shareholders (other than franchise and reputation, pri-
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marily important in the service of procuring short-term revenues.) Even if 
some rare species of financial firm shareholders took a long-term firm view, 
investors in financial firms are not interested in the health and viability of 
the entire financial (and credit) system. In a word, most financial firm 
shareholders are interested in the current profits of the firm in which they 
invest, with little regard for the long-term health of the firm itself, and no 
identifiable interest whatsoever in the entire financial system—sectoral, na-
tional, or global. 
III. The Pursuit of Current Shareholder  
Returns and Systemic Risk 
What is the key implication arising from this rather common sense in-
sight? Simply this: insofar as much-celebrated corporate governance norms 
make firm managers responsible to their shareholders, the same mecha-
nisms incentivize managers to be irresponsible vis à vis the entire system, 
implicating systemic risk. Lest these concerns seem entirely theoretical, let 
me invoke two illustrative examples from the recent global financial crisis: 
BNP Paribas and AIG. 
Before the depth of the crisis became apparent, French banking giant 
Banque National de Paris (BNP Paribas) implemented its own highly con-
servative risk capital and liquidity requirements (conservative and 
idiosyncratic, i.e., more stringent than those required under the Basel II Ac-
cords). Because of this wise course, profits at BNP Paribas lagged 
significantly behind those of high-flying European competitors Deutsche 
Bank and Société Generale (SocGen). BNP Paribas endured a drumbeat of 
criticism in the financial press, a sickly and static stock price, and disruptive 
shareholder efforts to change senior management. With the onset of the 
global financial crisis, however, both Deutsche Bank and SocGen were laid 
low along with the global financial sector, while BNP Paribas survived in 
far better shape and as a mainstay of the new, more responsible, global fi-
nancial order. This is one example of how traditional corporate governance 
principles rewarded managers at Deutsche Bank and SocGen for irresponsi-
ble risk-taking, higher short-term profitability, and a dynamic stock price, 
while punishing (and almost deposing) managers at BNP Paribas who im-
plemented wisely crafted prudential structures designed to ensure, inter alia, 
long-term firm and overall market stability and health. 
A second example invokes the now notorious AIG, widely recognized as 
“ground zero” for the crisis. Starting in the 1980s, AIG investors and senior 
managers alike were happy to allow the firm’s little-noticed (and even less-
governed or regulated) London-based Financial Products Division (FPD) to 
write guarantees structured as “credit default swaps” (CDSs) on collateral-
ized debt obligations—securitized instruments that, after the 1990s, were 
increasingly created on the back of an exploding volume of new mortgages 
sourced from the U.S. real estate bubble built on artificially low interest 
rates. Because so many of these CDS guarantees and the underlying obliga-
tions were initially deemed, and rated as, low risk (because the initial 
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obligations that were fed into the securitized instruments, and were risk-
modeled by underwriters and rating agencies, were corporate rather than 
homeowner obligations), and because AIG was not directly regulated as a 
bank or non-bank financial institution, AIG never hedged against or collat-
eralized its growing exposure. By 2008, the AIG FPD had exposure on these 
“insurance” contracts backing a wide variety of highly rated paper aggregat-
ing in the billions of U.S. dollars. Indeed, for AIG managers (and investors) 
this appeared to be “win-win”—a rich source of fees and premium income 
with no implication of serious risk given the ratings bestowed on the guar-
anteed collateralized debt obligations. By the summer of 2008, however, as 
the U.S. housing market collapsed, mortgagor home buyers obligated to pay 
into the mortgage-backed securities began defaulting in huge numbers. With 
default rates on the rise, rating agencies immediately downgraded the origi-
nally low-risk mortgage-backed securities, thereby triggering demands that 
AIG post ever-increasing amounts of collateral to protect the CDS purchas-
ers, and finally causing the U.S. government to bail out AIG with $150 
billion. Once again, the sorry story of AIG and its wildly “successful” and 
current profits-generating FPD shows how traditional corporate governance 
principles incentivized irresponsible and almost completely unmonitored 
risk-taking, higher short-term profitability, and a dynamic stock price, while 
ultimately putting at risk the continuing viability of CDS counterparty main-
stays of the global financial system (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Bank 
of America, etc.), not to mention the global financial system itself. 
IV. The Limits of Private Law 
Improved corporate governance at financial firms, then, is not a panacea 
for righting the global financial sector, and in fact may have contributed 
directly to the global financial crisis. As noted above, corporate governance 
norms are important and effective for the protection of shareholders (in par-
ticular minority shareholders) against insider opportunism and controlling 
shareholder–insider oppression. However, these near-perfect corporate gov-
ernance conventions pushed financial firms and their managers into high 
risk, high (short-term) reward areas for shareholders—areas that ultimately 
gave rise to the most significant threat to the health, stability, and allocation 
efficiency of financial markets for the world. The problem is not simply that 
judges construing corporate duties cannot take account of the interests of 
“other (non-shareholder) constituencies.” That consideration has become 
entirely permissible in the United States (and has for many years been ac-
cepted in continental Europe and Japan) at least since Unocal Corporation 
v. Mesa Petroleum Company,2 and in the wake of many state anti-takeover 
statutes (albeit tempered by the subsequent warning delivered in Revlon, 
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. against the protection of 
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“other” interests over and above shareholder interests in a sale-of-company 
scenario3). Instead, the real difficulty is that directors and managers are not 
well situated to think systemically or act in the long-term, national, or global 
public interest. And judges evaluating management decisions ex post are not 
competent to evaluate conformity with system-protecting (as against profit-
enhancing) standards in any predicable way. For example, should AIG’s 
apparently successful managers have turned away assured profits for AIG 
shareholders arising from CDSs written virtually non-stop on AAA-rated 
collateralized debt obligations because of some inchoate fear that the “going 
was too good,” or that a property bubble fed by U.S. Federal Reserve mone-
tary policy was going to burst? Similarly, how could any judge evaluate 
such management decisionmaking ex post and declare that the AIG manag-
ers were wrong to prioritize certain, short-term shareholder returns over a 
speculative (or completely unanticipated) medium-term global meltdown? 
The answer in both cases, unfortunately, is that what we wish for our man-
agement decisionmakers and ex post judicial evaluators is near impossible. 
Accordingly, our corporate governance norms only ask managers to work 
for shareholder profits, as we only ask judges to attend to shareholder wel-
fare (which usually focuses on value of shareholder participation in the 
firm) in evaluating conformity with controlling legal duties and applicable 
standards.
Recognition of this complex reality highlights the role of public-
interested regulators and the limits of private law. Because only a regula-
tor—independent, expert, not shareholder-focused—has the chance to 
ensure that value-enhancing, profit-seeking activities do not risk systemic 
injury and market collapse. Corporate governance, private law, and judges 
simply cannot do this, and as I have suggested here, may actually work 
against it. The global financial system has long benefited from the existence 
of such regulators and their prudential regulation of the increasingly global-
ized financial sector—even if we have also seen periods of disenchantment 
and frustration with the particular burdens of the regulatory state on “free 
markets” and (financial product) “innovation.” The global financial crisis of 
2008-2009 should teach us once again—at least with respect to financial 
institutions—that we are well advised to enhance prudential regulation by 
public authorities, over and above the intuitively appealing but wrong-
headed desire for “better” or more vigorously enforced corporate govern-
ance. 
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